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Abstract. Coordinated Atomic Actions have been proven successful for build-
ing dependable distributed systems due to their support for error recovery for
both competitive and cooperative concurrent activities. This chapter introduces
the formal specification of Coordinated Atomic Actions emphasizing the formal-
ization of proposed dependability mechanisms using the B formal method. The
specification then allows developing dependable systems, where the B formal
specification can be refined to obtain a correct implementation of the associated
runtime support.
1 Introduction
Dependability of systems is defined by the reliance that can be put on the service they
deliver [5]. Developing distributed systems that are dependable is recognized as a com-
plex task, requiring adequate mechanisms for dealing with the occurrence of failures.
Coordinated Atomic Actions (CA Actions) [10] provide a general structuring mecha-
nism for developing dependable systems through the exploitation of atomic actions and
transactions. The composition of Coordinated Atomic Actions [7] further extends the
base CA Action concept for developing open distributed systems.
Several applications have proven that Coordinated Atomic Actions are effective for
building dependable concurrent systems [11, 2]. Dependability properties of such ap-
plications are proved using model-checking from their formal specifications using Petri
nets and temporal logic [8, 6]. However, these specifications give formal verifications
of dependability properties of specific applications and do not provide a general ab-
stract formal model of Coordinated Atomic Actions. Such a model is given in [9] using
timed CSP, however the specification is oriented towards the description of real-time
safety-critical systems and the authors do not provide the formal specification of fault
tolerance mechanisms of CA Actions, which is our main concern.
2Our approach differs from the above work as it aims at providing a language for
developing dependable distributed systems using fault tolerance mechanisms that are
formally specified and implemented. Towards that goal, we provide a formal specifica-
tion of the Coordinated Atomic Action model using the B formal method, from which
we derive an XML-based language to be used to develop dependable distributed sys-
tems.
Properties of the Coordinated Atomic Action concept, and in particular the proper-
ties of the associated fault tolerance mechanisms (e.g., transactional accesses to shared
external resources and embedded coordinated exception handling mechanisms) are spec-
ified in terms of invariants and pre-conditions on operations, which translate into run-
time verification associated with the language’s constructs. B refinement further allows
offering an implementation of the run-time support associated with the language that is
correct with respect to the B specification.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly presents Coordinated Atomic
Actions and their composition. Sections 3 and 4 then introduce the B formal specifi-
cation of the CA Action concept, discussing in particular the specification of fault tol-
erance mechanisms offered by CA Actions. Finally, Section 5 concludes, summarizing
our contribution and discussing areas for future work.
2 Architecting Dependable Systems with Coordinated Atomic
Actions
2.1 CA Actions
Coordinated Atomic Actions [10] (CA Actions) are a structuring mechanism for de-
veloping dependable concurrent systems through the generalization of the concepts of
atomic actions [3] and transactions [4]. Atomic actions are used for controlling cooper-
ative concurrency among a set of participating processes and for realizing coordinated
forward error recovery using exception handling. Transactions are used for maintaining
the coherency of shared external resources that are competitively accessed by concur-
rent actions. Each CA Action is designed as a multi-entry unit with roles activated by
action participants, which cooperate within the action. A transaction is started on exter-
nal objects and it terminates at the end of the CA Action.
A CA Action terminates with a normal outcome if no exception has been raised or
if an exception has been raised and handled successfully; all transactions on external
objects are then committed. If a participant raises an exception inside an action and if
the exception cannot be handled locally by the participant, the exception is propagated
to all the other participants of the CA Action for coordinated error recovery. If several
exceptions have been raised concurrently they are resolved using a resolution tree im-
posing a partial order on all action exceptions, and the participants handle the resolved
exception [3]. If coordinated recovery fails, the Coordinated Atomic Action terminates
with an exceptional outcome. An exception is then signalled by the CA Action and
transactions on external objects are aborted.
Coordinated Atomic Actions can be designed in a recursive way using action nest-
ing. Several participants of a CA Action can co-enter into a nested CA Action, which
3defines an atomic operation inside the embedding CA Action. Accesses to external
objects within a nested action are performed as nested transactions so that if the em-
bedding CA Action terminates exceptionally, all sub-transactions that were committed
by nested actions are aborted as well. A CA Action participant can only enter one con-
current nested action at a time. Furthermore, a CA Action terminates only when all it’s
nested actions have completed. Note that if the nested action terminates exceptionally,
an exception is signalled to the containing CA Action.
As an illustration, Figure 1 depicts a CA Action A1 that is composed of three partic-
ipants P1, P2, and P3 and that comprises two nested CA Actions, A11 and A12; nested
transactions are further executed on external objects. An exception raised by partici-
pant P2 is propagated to participants P1 and P2, which causes the CA Action to enter
an exceptional state, as shown by the greyed box, where the participants cooperate for
handling the exception.
P1
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Transactions
Coordinated Exception
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exception
Fig. 1. Coordinated Atomic Actions
CA Actions mainly focus on structuring concurrent systems and on providing their
fault tolerance by exception handling. One of the main intentions behind CA Actions is
to employ them as a core mechanism for structuring complex distributed applications:
they promote recursive view on system execution by abstracting away both normal and
abnormal behaviour of the low level software.
2.2 CA Actions Composition
Composing Coordinated Atomic Actions allows the design of open distributed systems
built out of several CA Actions [7]. Unlike base CA Action nesting where a subset of
action participants co-enters into a nested action, composed CA Actions are autonomous
4entities with their own participants and external objects. The resulting system is named
a composite CA Action, built out of multiple autonomous composed CA Actions. In
this model, any participant of a CA Action can dynamically initiate the creation of a
composed CA Action. In addition, the model enables the reuse of existing CA Actions
in different CA Action compositions.
The internal structure of a composed CA Action (i.e., set of participants, accessed
external objects and participants’ behaviour) is hidden from the calling CA Action,
which only has access to the composed CA Action’s interface. A participant that calls
a composed CA Action enters a waiting state in a way similar to a synchronous RPC.
The participant then resumes its execution according to the outcome of the composed
CA Action. If the composed CA Action terminates exceptionally, its calling participant
raises an internal exception which is possibly locally handled. If local handling is not
possible, the exception is propagated to all the peer participants for coordinated error
recovery. Note that unlike nesting, when a composed CA Action has terminated with
a normal outcome, an abort operation of the containing CA Action does not automati-
cally compensate effects of the composed one; specific handling must be performed at
a higher level, e.g., a composed action can be initiated to abort or compensate actions
on external objects if needed. We assume thus that transactions performed by composed
CA Actions on external resources are compensable. It means that when a CA Action
aborts and there is a composed CA Action that has committed before, then all transac-
tions associated to this composed CA action have to be compensated.
Figure 2 illustrates the use of nested and composed CA Actions, considering a travel
agency system. The top-level CA Action comprises the User and the Travel participants;
the former interacts with the user while the latter achieves joint booking according to
the user’s request. The CA Action has further access to the Banking System. In a first
step, the User participant requests the Travel participant to search for a trip. This leads
the participants to enter the nested action SearchTrip in which the Travel participant
invokes a composed action comprising the Hotel and the Flight participants. The ex-
ternal objects accessed by those participants are the hotel and flight booking system.
The SearchTrip action, if successful, returns a list of possible trips. Then, according to
the User’s selection, the BookTrip nested action is executed, leading to initiate another
composed CA Action to book the given trip. If an exception is raised within the com-
posed CA Action (e.g., no flight available for a given destination) and if it cannot be
handled internally, the composed action terminates exceptionally by aborting all trans-
actions on external objects and signals a failure exception to the higher level, i.e., to the
calling participant.
3 Specifying Coordinated Atomic Actions in B
3.1 The B Method
B is a complete formal method [1] that supports a large part of the development life
cycle, from abstract specification to implementation. The B formal method is a model-
based method, which is based on set theory and predicate logic and extended by gener-
alized substitutions. B specifications are represented by abstract machines encapsulat-
ing states (i.e., initialised variables and invariants) and state transformations described
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Fig. 2. CA Actions Composition
as operations (see Figure 3). Generally speaking, the B method allows us to define
abstract machines and refinements over them in order to obtain equivalent but more
concrete machines (see Figure 4). During the refinement, non-determinism is reduced
and preconditions are relaxed, but the interfaces of the operations remain the same. At
the end of the refinement process, an implementation can be written, which corresponds
to an executable code.
Proofs are an essential part of the B formal method: it should be proven that all op-
erations preserve the invariants of the machine, and that the implementations and refine-
ments preserve the invariants and the behaviour of the initial abstract machine. There
are various tools that help writing and proving B specifications. The main of them are
B-Tool4 and Atelier B5. Both tools include a type checker, an animator, a proof obliga-
tion generator, theorem provers, code translators and documentation facilities. We used
the two software suites as we found in our investigation that they are complementary.
We used thus a notation that is compatible with both of them.
3.2 Modelling Coordinated Atomic Actions
Our goal in developing the B specification of Coordinated Atomic Actions is to offer a
general framework that can be instantiated to describe the implementation of a specific
system that is developed using CA Actions. The framework defines the system compo-
4 http://www.b-core.com/btool.html
5 http://www.atelierb.societe.com
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Fig. 4. B Refinement Process
nents and associated fault tolerance mechanisms related to the dependability properties
of CA Actions, which will be enforced for any system based on them.
For the sake of modularity, and for easing automated proofs, the B formal specifica-
tion of Coordinated Atomic Actions is given by three abstract machines, each defining
a set of the system components. These abstract machines are then composed using the
B machine composition mechanisms as illustrated in Figure 5. In particular, the EX-
TENDS clause of B is used to compose several machines into one machine. Note that
an additional abstract machine that defines some constants used by all machines is in-
troduced and is included in all the definitions of the main abstract machines using the
SEES clause, which makes possible to share resources provided by one machine with
another.
The PARTICIPANTS abstract machine describes participants of a Coordinated Ato-
mic Action and the OBJECTS abstract machine describes external objects that can be
accessed by a CA Action participant during a transaction. The CAACTIONS abstract
machine that extends the above two machines, defines operations associated with the
execution of Coordinated Atomic Actions: creation, termination, nesting and composi-
tion of CA Actions, message exchange between participants, and exception handling.
The CONST machine further contains global declarations and is seen by all the other
machines.
In the remainder, we introduce the main elements of the B specification, focusing
on dependability properties associated with CA Actions; the interested reader may find
the complete specification at http://www-rocq.inria.fr/˜tartanog/dsos/.
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3.3 Specifying States and State Transformations
The state of the overall system is defined by the states of the constituent abstract ma-
chines given by their variables and invariants. Operations are further defined and they
describe the state transformations.
For instance, the state of the PARTICIPANTS abstract machine characterizes the
participants of a Coordinated Atomic Action as follows:
– The PARTICIPANT set is declared in the CONST abstract machine and represents
all possible participants that can be involved in a Coordinated Atomic Action. A
participant that enters in a Coordinated Atomic Action is included in the subset
participant of PARTICIPANT and removed at the end of the action:
participant⊆ PARTICIPANT
– During the execution of a Coordinated Atomic Action, a participant’s state can be
normal, exceptional or waiting. The state is set to normal at the initialization of a
CA Action. When an exception has been raised it is set to exceptional and the state
is waiting if the participant invokes a composed Coordinated Atomic Action and is
blocked until the action’s termination. Since a participant can have different states
in nested actions, we memorize them using a sequence:
PARTICIPANT STATE = {normal, exceptional, waiting}
participant state ∈ PARTICIPANT 7→ seq(PARTICIPANT STATE)
8– Each participant has a value (a set of variables), corresponding to the local state of
the participant, that is initialised at the CA Action creation phase and logged for
later use in case of backward recovery:
participant value ∈ PARTICIPANT 7→ VALUE
initial values ∈ PARTICIPANT 7→ seq(VALUE)
The OBJECTS abstract machine defines the OBJECT set for all external objects that
can be accessed by a participant. These objects are assumed to provide transactional in-
terfaces to allow performing transactional operations such as begin, commit, and abort.
If one or more participants access external objects, distributed transaction protocols,
supported by the underlying systems of external objects, should be used. Furthermore,
to allow nested CA Actions to access external shared resources, we require that the
external objects implement some nested transaction protocol. In our specification we
model transaction protocols in an abstract way (i.e., by defining the behaviours of main
transactional operations begin, commit and abort). Further refinements of the abstract
machine then would allow the specification of the aforementioned specialized proto-
cols.
– The subset object specify external objects that take part in a transaction at a given
time:
object ⊆ OBJECT
– The state of the external objects are defined using a variable for each object:
values ∈ OBJECT → VALUE
The state of the CAACTIONS abstract machine, which specifies all CA Actions
(top-level, nested and composed CA Actions) is defined by the following attributes.
– An abstract set CAACTION is introduced together with subset caaction of the CA
Actions that are running at a given state of the system:
caaction ⊆ CAACTION
– Two types of actions are distinguished: top-level CA Actions and nested actions. In
addition, two variables are used to memorize the nesting and composition relation-
ships of Coordinated Atomic Actions:
is nested ∈ caaction↔ caaction
is composed ∈ participant 7→ caaction
9– Coordinated Atomic Actions can be in a normal state (all the participants are in
normal state) or exceptional (all the participants are in exceptional state):
CAACTION STATE = {normal, exceptional}
caaction state ∈ caaction → CAACTION STATE
– Each CA Action has a set of participants and each of them participates to a se-
quence of nested CA Actions, so that in case of nesting, the nested CA Action is
added to the sequence and is removed when the nested CA Action terminates:
participant of caaction ∈ caaction →P (participant)
caaction of participant ∈ participant→ seq(caaction)
– CA Actions access several external objects:
caaction objects ∈ caaction ↔ object
Several invariant properties of the Coordinated Atomic Actions have been identified
and specified. They are written as constraints on the variables of the abstract machines
given above. Each abstract machine then defines the behaviour of the operations of-
fered by CA Actions. Operations that are relevant to the fault tolerance mechanisms are
discussed in the next section.
The operations that we have specified define several types of state transformations
found in the CA Action concept such as the creation and termination of (possibly
nested) atomic actions, the cooperation of participants, the CA Action composition pro-
cesses, the transactional access of participants to externally shared resources, and the
coordinated handling of exceptions:
– Operations on CA Actions:
• create main caaction(c, P, O) : Creates a main Coordinated Atomic Action
c. A set of participants P are bound to the action created and a top-level trans-
action is initiated on the set of objects O.
• create nested caaction(c, c’, P, O) : Creates a nested Coordinated Atomic
Action c within the embedding action c’. A set of participants P, wich is a
subset of the participants of c’, is bound to the nested action and a nested trans-
action is initiated on the set of objects O, a subset of external objects associated
to c’;
• compose caaction(p, c, P, O) : Called when participant p composes a new CA
Action. The operation creates a new top-level Coordinated Atomic Action and
sets the relationship composer-composed between the participant p that initi-
ated the composition and the newly created atomic action c;
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• abort caaction(c): Aborts the Coordinated Atomic Action c, sending a trans-
actional abort message to all of its external objects. An alternative of this oper-
ation is abort nested caaction for aborting nested CA Actions;
• terminate caaction(c): Terminates the Coordinated Atomic Action c, either
in a normal or in an exceptional state (defined as a separate operation termi-
nate caaction exceptional), in which case an exception is raised in the con-
taining action if any. Variants are terminate nested caaction and terminate -
nested caaction exceptional;
– Operations on participants:
• {send, recv} message(p, p’, m) : Sends or receives a message m from one
participant p to a peer participant p’;
• raise exception(p, e): Raises an exception e in participant p;
• propagate exception(p): Propagates the exception raised in p to all the partic-
ipants of the last atomic action in which p takes part;
• add participant(p), remove participant(p) and set participant state(p,s):
Operations called from other operations for adding and removing participants
to (possibly nested) CA Actions and for setting their states.
– Operations on external objects:
• add objects(O): Called within a newly created top-level action. It initiates a
transaction on external objects O. The variant operation add nested objects(O)
is called from a nested CA Action to initiate nested transactions.
• access object(p, o , f ): Applies function f to the external object o within a
transaction identified by the CA Action in which the participant p takes part;
• remove objects(O,v) and remove nested objects(O,v): Terminate top-level
or nested transactions on external objects O by either committing or aborting
the transaction.
Invariant properties and the behaviours of the operations are defined focusing on
dependability properties enforced by the fault tolerant mechanisms associated with CA
Actions.
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4 Enforcing Fault Tolerance
The fault tolerance mechanisms embedded within Coordinated Atomic Actions fall into
three categories: (i) transactional access to shared external resources, (ii) atomicity and
isolation of Coordinated Atomic Actions, and (iii) coordinated exception handling.
4.1 Transactions on External Objects
Accesses to external objects within Coordinated Atomic Actions are performed accord-
ing to classical nested transaction rules.
– The operation that creates a top-level CA Action c (create main caaction) calls
the operation add object(caaction objects[{c}]) that initiates the transaction on
external objects associated to the CA Action given by the set caaction objects[{c}]
by affecting a begin value to these external objects:
add objects(o) =
PRE
o ⊆ OBJECT ∧ o ∩ object = ∅
THEN
values := values C− o × {begin} ||
object := object ∪ o
END;
Nested transactions are initiated using the similar add nested object operation.
Preconditions on such operations ensures that general rules and constraints of the un-
derlying transaction protocol are satisfied:
– Participants P of the nested CA Action c can only access a subset O of external
objects associated to the containing CA Action c’. This constraint is ensured with
the following precondition of the create nested caaction(c,c’,P,O) operation:
∀ o.(o ∈ O ⇒ o ∈ caaction objects[{c’}])
– Then, the operation initiates a nested transaction on the external object using the
(add nested objects(O)) operation call.
– When a (possibly nested) Coordinated Atomic Action terminates its execution nor-
mally (terminate caaction(c) is called), it commits transactions on external ob-
jects within the remove objects(O,v) operation:
remove objects(caaction ext objects[{c}],commit)
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– On the other hand, if the CA Action terminates exceptionally or aborts, all the trans-
actions that it initiated on external objects are aborted as well:
remove objects(caaction ext objects[{c}],abort)
We have given in the above only interface operation calls on the underlying transac-
tional supports of external objects (they are assumed to offer such a support as discussed
in previous section). This supposes that nested transactions are aborted by the underly-
ing transactional support of external objects.
4.2 Atomicity and Isolation of Coordinated Atomic Actions
Coordinated Atomic Actions are atomic in the sense that they support full backward
error recovery in case of abortion (all transactions are aborted on external objects), i.e.,
they adhere to an all-or-nothing semantic. Coherency of shared resources is ensured
using transactions as described above. Furthermore, all the execution of participants
(e.g., cooperation of the participants) is encapsulated inside atomic and isolated com-
putation units using nested and composed CA Actions. In the B specification, properties
like atomicity and isolation are enforced using invariant properties, that preconditioned
operations have to satisfy :
– The following invariant property of the CAACTION abstract machine states that
participants of a nested CA Action c are also participants of the containing action
c’:
∀ (c, c’).((c ∈ caaction ∧ c’ ∈ caaction ∧ (c,c’) ∈ is nested)
⇒ participants of caaction(c)
⊆ participants of caaction(c’) )
– In the case where a participant invokes the creation of a composed CA Action,
participants P of the composed CA Action must not be involved in any other CA
Action, which is simply ensured by the following precondition of the operation that
initiates the composition compose caaction:
P ∩ participant = ∅
The isolation property of Coordinated Atomic Actions allows only intra-action com-
munications. No information may be exchanged between actions unless a CA Action
terminates and send results (or signal an exception) to a calling action. In the same way,
sharing information using external objects follows rules of the underlying transaction
model.
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– Communication between participants p and p’ within a CA Action (operations
{send, recv} message(p, p’, m)) is realized by message exchanges. Preconditions
of these operations set the rules of message exchange that is only allowed between
participants of the same (possibly nested) CA Action. The participants must be in
the same state (normal or exceptional). Finally, a participant that is in a waiting
state (i.e., waiting for a composed CA Action to terminate) cannot send or receive
any message:
caaction of participant(p) = caaction of participant(p’) ∧
last(participant state(p)) = last(participant state(p’)) ∧
last(participant state(p)) 6= waiting
– Rules of nesting and composition are further specified with the following precondi-
tions of the CA Action termination operations (terminate caaction(c) and alterna-
tives) stating, that a CA Action terminates when all embedded nested and composed
CA Actions have terminated:
caaction 6∈ ran(is nested) ∧ caaction 6∈ ran(is composed)
– Furthermore, a participant can only enter one sibling nested CA Action at a time,
which means that all participants in P willing to enter a nested CA Action are in
the same containing CA Action. This constraint is enforced by the following pre-
condittion of the operation create nested caaction(c, c’, P, O):
card(ran({ p, c | p ∈ P ∧ c ∈ CAACTION ∧
c= last(caaction of participant(p)) } )) = 1
– Finally, the participants P willing to enter a nested CA Action must all be in the
same state, normal or exceptional. The precondition of the create nested caaction
states:
card(ran({ p, state | p ∈ P ∧
state ∈ PARTICIPANT STATE ∧
state= last(participant state(p))} )
) = 1 ∧
∀ (p).(p ∈ P ⇒ last(participant state(p)) 6= waiting )
4.3 Coordinated Exception Handling
Coordinated exception handling is started within a Coordinated Atomic Action when
an exception raised by a participant has been propagated to all of the participants of the
containing action. Each participant then resolves concurrent exceptions – if needed –
and executes synchronously an exception handler for the exception resulting from the
resolution. Rules for exception raising and propagation are specified by the following
invariants and pre-conditioned operations.
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– The following invariant of the CAACTION abstract machine ensures that a Coordi-
nated Atomic Action is set to an exceptional state if all of its participants are in the
exceptional state. Note that the participant can be in a waiting state following a call
to a composed CA Action, in which case the test is performed on the last state of
the participant before the call:
∀ (c). (c ∈ caaction ∧ caaction state(c)= exceptional
⇒ ∀ (p).(p ∈ participant of caaction(c)
⇒ ((last(participant state(p)) ∈ EXCEPTIONAL STATE) ∨
((last(participant state(pa)) = waiting ∧
last(front(participant state(p)))∈ EXCEPTIONAL STATE)))))
Exception raising and propagation (to other participants) is realized by two opera-
tions defined in the CAACTIONS machine.
– The raise exception operation requires that the participant and the CA Action are
in the normal state, and sets the participant’s state to exceptional. Note that when a
coordinated exception handling fails and an exception should be signalled outside
the action, we use the distinct operation terminate caaction exceptional :
raise exception (p, exception) =
PRE
p ∈ participant ∧
exception ∈ EXCEPTIONAL STATE ∧
last(participant state(p)) = normal ∧
caaction state(last(caaction of participant(p))) = normal
THEN
set participants state({p}, exception)
END;
– The propagate exception operation is then called to propagate the exception to all
participants of the Coordinated Atomic Action. The resolve exception function is
used to resolve concurrently raised exceptions (the exact behaviour of this function
will be defined in further refinements) and is defined as follows:
resolve exception: (PARTICIPANT STATE×P(PARTICIPANT STATE))
→ EXCEPTIONAL STATE
The propagate exception operation then requires that the CA Action where the ex-
ception will be propagated is in normal state (i.e., propagating an exception when
the CA Action is in exceptional state is not allowed), and verifies that the partic-
ipants are not engaged in any composed or nested CA Action. In that case, the
pre-condition will not be satisfied and a further refinement may be for example (i)
to delay the propagation until all embedded nested and composed action terminate
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or (ii), to abort these actions and recover the state of the participants to the previous
normal state. At the end of the propagation process that sets the participants states
to exceptional, the Coordinated Atomic Action’s state is set to exceptional as well:
propagate exception(p) =
PRE
p ∈ participant ∧
last(participant state(p)) ∈ EXCEPTIONAL STATE ∧
caaction state(last(caaction of participant(p))) = normal ∧
∀ p’.(p’ ∈ participant of caaction(last(caaction of particip(p)))
⇒ last(participant state(p’)) 6= waiting ) ∧
card(ran({p’,c |
p’ ∈ participant of caaction(
last(caaction of participant(p))) ∧
c ∈ CAACTION ∧ c = last(caaction of participant(p’))
} ) ) = 1
THEN
LET ps BE
ps = { p’, s |
p’ ∈ participant of caaction(
last(caaction of participant(p)))∧
s ∈ PARTICIPANT STATE ∧
s= last(participant state(p’))
}
IN
LET s’ BE
s’ = resolve exception(last(participantant state(p)),ran(ps) )
IN
set participants state (participant of caaction(
last(caaction of participant(p))), s’) ||
caaction state(last(caaction of participant(p))) := exceptional
END
END
END;
If a Coordinated Atomic Action terminates in an exceptional state, all transactions
on external objects are aborted by calling the operation remove objects(O, abort)
within the operation terminate caaction exceptional(c). If the CA Action is a nested
or a composed one, then an exception is signalled to a higher level.
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5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented how to specify fault tolerance mechanisms using the B for-
mal method. We have considered the use of Coordinated Atomic Actions that have been
proved useful for building dependable systems. We have defined a generic formal speci-
fication using the B method, defining systems composed of several Coordinated Atomic
Actions that make concurrent accesses to external objects. B was chosen because of its
powerful theorem proving ability and because of availability of a number of mature
tools. We have shown how to specify the following dependability mechanisms of CA
Actions: (i) constraints related to the atomic accesses to external transactional objects,
(ii) encapsulation of computations inside atomic action units ensured through action
nesting and composition and (iii), properties related to the behaviour of the system in
case of exception occurrences.
In order to have an implementation of the CA Action’s run-time support, the abstract
machines should be refined. At the end of the refinement process, we will have an
executable code that correspond to the implementation of the operations defining the
B machines, offered as a programming library. Note that when implementing the CA
Actions, some existing libraries such as drivers for running transactions on external
shared resources may be used. For all these libraries, what is usually known is the
interfaces of the offered methods. In order to be able to prove the correctness of the
implementation it would be necessary: (i) to have in addition the formal specification of
the behaviour of these methods and (ii), to prove that the refinements of the machines
that use these methods are correct (in the B sense). During the refinement, the non-
determinism will be reduced (e.g., by introducing of reliable message queues if sending
a message is not possible when the receiving participant is in a waiting state, resulting
in a false pre-condition). The preconditions have to be relaxed in order to take into
account all the possible cases. The formal specification together with the refinement
process give an executable code that is correct with respect to the specification.
Up to now several implementations of Coordinated Atomic Actions have been pro-
posed and experimented with, but mainly on closed systems [11, 2]. We are working
on an implementation of CA Action-based systems to be defined as a composition of
Web services such as a travel agency that composes several existing autonomous Web
services. This kind of loosely-coupled system compositions clearly needs new depend-
ability properties (e.g., relaxed atomicity properties for accessing external objects). We
intend to use this initial B specification to define and to study such properties.
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